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R ecently, the cover of an issue of Time (29 Jan. 2007)that appeared to promoteancient phrenology caughtmy attention. Closer inspec-
tion showed it to be a “Mind & Body
Special Issue.” This surprised me
because The Economist’s special
Christmas/New Year issue (23 Dec.
2006) had featured the supplement “A
Survey of the Brain.” So I bought the
copy of Time to compare with the 
earlier issue of The Economist.
Although both started with a signed
introduction, the rest of the content was
stylistically opposed. The Economist
had five anonymous reports compiled
from interviews with, and quotations
of, experts, the lot decorated with a few
drawings and diagrams. Time had 10
richly illustrated essays informed and
often written by experts, and followed
by a short puzzle section. The contest,
if indeed it was one, seemed to be a
standoff, like a saber versus a shillelagh.
The computing profession is rele-
vant here. For example, certain aspects
of computer architecture can be used
to explain the functioning of the brain
and its mind, and I tried to do this in
an earlier column (“Would a Digital
Brain Have a Mind?” Computer, May
2002, pp. 112, 110-111), inspired by
an encounter with philosophers con-
templating the nature of the mind.
One issue that seems to have won
general acceptance holds that the
mind is a process hosted by the sub-
stance of the brain and its nervous
system. The mind is like the execution
of a program, the brain the machine
that holds the program and carries
out the processing it specifies.
The most prominent topic in 
both publications was consciousness.
Time’s lead article referred to “a
bracing new field, the science of con-
sciousness.” The Economist’s lengthy
article on the topic referred to “what
is, perhaps, the greatest mystery of
the human brain: the nature of con-
sciousness.” Judging by the content
of these two magazines, however,
they appear to be promoting a neo-
dualism, one that seems to contrast
the conscious and unconscious mind
and to dismiss lower animals as
unconscious. The nature of comput-
ers can help illuminate these issues.
CONSCIOUSNESS
Time’s lead article focused on two
problems this new science faces—one
easy and one hard—as dubbed by
philosopher David Chalmers. The
Easy Problem (their capitals) “is to
distinguish consciousness from
unconscious mental computation,
identify its correlates in the brain and
explain why it evolved.  The Hard
Problem is explaining how subjective
experience arises from neural com-
putation.”
Behind both problems lies the
assumption that two kinds of mentality
exist, with the brain divided into two
parts, one hosting conscious thought
and the other unconscious, presumably
much as old mainframe architectures
shared processing between a central
processing unit and peripheral device
control units. 
This analogy holds some relevance.
Just as a disk control unit will, with a
little negotiation with the CPU,
manipulate data flowing between
disks and the main store, so do the
retinas in the eye work on the data
provided by its receptors to analyze
and greatly compress that data before
sending it along the optic nerve.
Awareness or alertness is one kind
of consciousness, and it has two
aspects. We judge other people to be
conscious by how they behave, that
is, by their motor behavior. Until
recently, we judged people in a vege-
tative state to be unconscious. Now,
magnetic resonance imaging has
shown that the brains of at least some
of these unfortunates react to stimu-
lus just as an ordinary person’s brain
does. They are like a mainframe com-
puter with a broken output controller.
We judge ourselves to be conscious
by our awareness of sensations.
However, this consciousness is not an
on-or-off phenomenon because we
have degrees of awareness. We can be
wide awake or drowsy or somewhere
in between. We drift into sleep, then
become unconscious to different
degrees at different stages, character-
ized by ease of arousal. Sleep is unlike
the unconsciousness brought about
by a concussion, from which there is 
no immediate arousal. This uncon-
sciousness is like the state of a 
computer with no battery and its
power supply turned off, while the
unconsciousness of sleep is like the
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The third part, to “explain why it
evolved,” is much easier. It can be done
in two stages: by explaining why the
central nervous system evolved, and by
explaining why consciousness evolved.
Animals move around, plants do
not. Animals have nervous systems,
plants do not. A nervous system is
needed to control movement. Rela-
tively few animals (metazoa) have 
diffuse nervous systems; most—in 
particular protostomes, which include
insects, and deuterostomes, which
include mammals—have a central ner-
vous system. Indeed, the very early
Urbilateria, from which both proto-
and deuterostomes descend, seems to
have had such a system, one that sends
sensory signals to the brain for it to
process into motor signals (www.
economist.com/science/PrinterFriendly.
cfm?story_id=9033083). Likewise, the
first digital computer I used, an IBM
650, read data from cards, sent the
data to the CPU for processing, then
sent out the results to be punched into
cards.
Simple animals have simple nervous
systems, complex animals have com-
plex ones. A nervous system controls
its animal in its environment, sensing
the surroundings, evaluating the sen-
sations it receives, and commanding
action. The action might be to feed,
flee, freeze, fight, or—for sexual ani-
mals—fornicate. If the nervous system
succeeds—a subjective term—the indi-
vidual animal survives and propagates.
Are simple animals conscious?
Certainly, they are aware of their sur-
roundings and react to stimuli, so they
are conscious to some degree. But
because their brains are simple, they
react in simple ways that might seem
unconscious to us.
sleep state of the laptop I’m writing
this essay on, which has two levels.
Another aspect of consciousness is
its capacity for awareness rather than
its awareness at any time. There are
those who would like to see this aspect
as binary to distinguish between clever
animals like humans who are aware of
themselves and “lower” beings that
are not. The popular test for this is to
put a mirror in front of the subjects to
be tested and observe if they are aware
of looking at themselves. Clearly, this
is a kind of intelligence test, and it was
widely thought that only humans and
maybe chimpanzees could pass it.
Lately, the number of species that pass
the test has been growing and, in any
case, the observer imposes the binarity.
THE EASY PROBLEM
The first part of The Easy Problem,
“to distinguish consciousness from
unconscious mental computation,” is
impossible in absolute terms because
it assumes that the distinction can be
cleanly made. Consciousness is a spec-
trum, not a switch. We can subjectively
distinguish degrees of consciousness.
The second part, to “identify its cor-
relates in the brain,” is also difficult
because consciousness is a matter of
degree. The forebrain seems to play a
large part in awareness, but only a part.
We are unconscious of our retinas
but not of the vision they give us,
which begs the question of where
along the neural path between eye and
forebrain unconsciousness stops and
consciousness begins. We are con-
scious of the words we say but uncon-
scious of the motor processes
producing the speech, which raises the
question of where the boundary lies
along the neural path between the
forebrain and the larynx.
Consciousness can wander around
the brain. While we are unconscious
of our larynx when conversing, some-
one learning to speak a foreign lan-
guage, or learning to sing, is not. For
a ballet dancer learning a new work,
consciousness moves from steps to
choreography to nuances to perfor-
mance; in performance, the lower lev-
els become unconscious.
Complex animals evolved from sim-
ple ones, and they became complex
because their bodies and their nervous
systems became larger. Their senses,
brains, and motor systems became
more complex. Greater mobility
meant richer sensation and required a
more structured brain to process the
sensations and to make more sensitive
decisions about more complex poten-
tial behavior. 
Evolution used parts of this structure
to simplify and thus speed up decision
making by storing patterns of sensation
and behavior, which could be drawn
upon unconsciously in commonly
repeated situations. This freed up other
parts to work with unconscious analy-
ses of sensations and consciously select
from available behaviors.
Analogous in the evolution of digi-
tal computers would be the cache’s
storing of more frequently used data,
and the microprogram’s storing of fre-
quently used microprocesses. However,
such analogies must not be carried too
far. Nervous systems are not digital
devices, nor do they separate signal
processing from storing their content.
THE HARD PROBLEM
The Hard Problem is simply
“explaining how subjective experience
arises from neural computation,”
though if we give a strict meaning to
the word compute, there is no neural
computation. Our analog mental
processes carry out mental not neural
arithmetic, which combines conscious
and unconscious thought, the propor-
tions depending on the thinker’s skill.
Subjective experience comes from
social experience. Even in the womb,
which is not a silent place, we learn
about sound. We are born with an
underdeveloped central nervous system,
and all our consciousness is developed
socially, or should be. The less social
experience a child gets during infancy,
the less its nervous system will develop,
the poorer its consciousness will be, and
the more difficult it will be for the ado-
lescent to develop subjective capability.
A newborn child cannot see properly,
and its visual experience causes its
visual system to develop and refine. The
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stupendous subjectiveness of spoken
language develops in an infant by social
experience and, for an infant given the
opportunity, it is as easy to learn sev-
eral languages as it is to learn one.
Speech, an important part of our sub-
jective experience, is learned through
conversation. Tragically, adverse fam-
ily conditions and television’s ready
availability have meant that children
starting school in developed countries
sometimes are unable to converse,
requiring remedial training before they
can begin their formal education.
Education is, or should be, a cumu-
lative social process that seeks to enrich
subjectivity. Because conscious behav-
ior is rich to the degree that the uncon-
scious background is rich, effective
education will convert as much con-
scious capability as possible into uncon-
scious form. Thus, education should
give priority to developing basic skills
so that the student can consciously use
more and more of them. The needed
process is clear in special programs,
such as those promoting excellence in
music or athletics, but it is not often
adopted in general education.
Because our consciousness is social,
we have no useful analogy in digital
computers. But there is another dimen-
sion of mentality to consider—a spec-
trum of styles of consciousness. At one
end lies the consciousness that is
entirely sensual, filled with sensation
and reaction. A mainframe is like this
when it is I/O-bound. At the other end
lies the entirely contemplative con-
sciousness, filled with evaluation and
speculation. A mainframe is like this
when it is compute-bound. An ideal
consciousness will wander around the
middle of this spectrum.
Digital technology has a role to play in education and has greatpotential to support the enrich-
ment of consciousness. Unfortunately,
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it is much more often used in an unbal-
anced way. An example I read of when
almost finished with this essay was so
unbalanced as to be inhumane, and it
brought tears to my eyes (www.theage.
com.au/news/opinion/killing-soldiers-
humanity/2007/06/03/11808093363
64.html).
The computing profession has a
social responsibility to ensure that dig-
ital technology enriches young people
rather than encumbering them. ■
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